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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Repair parts are critical to maintaining the battlefield 
readiness of most warfighting systems. As these systems 
become more sophisticated and complex, the added cost of this 
refinement leads to fewer actual systems in the field while 
increasing their impact on mission success. The MK 16 
Underwater Breathing Apparatus (MK 16) is one system that has 
grown dramatically in capability, complexity and cost. 
Designed for Mine Counter Measures (MCM) operations, this 
electronically controlled diving equipment is a significant 
improvement over previous options. The MK 16's ten-fold 
increase in effectiveness over its predecessor was accompanied 
by a 10-fold increase in the number of repair parts. Ships 
Parts Control Center (SPCC) lists 341 different types of 
replaceable parts for the MK 16. Out of those, 257 are 
replaceable at the user level (O-Level) with 184 classified as 
essential to the MK 16 mission. An additional 84 repair parts 
are listed as Depot level replaceable. The goal of this 
research is to identify the most effective method of 
determining the type and quantity of repair parts that best 
supports mission success during a deployment of the MK 16. 
Each system that can be repaired by the organization that 
operates it maintains a supply of repair parts. Incorrect 
selection of the type of parts held in inventory, or too few 
of them, leads to shortages that make the system unavailable 
for battle. Too many, or unnecessary repair parts, is a mis- 
allocation of the command's budget; items more valuable to the 
mission are not funded because of the hidden cost of excess 
repair parts inventory. The costs of holding inventory 
include capital investment, storage, and losses from 
obsolescence and deterioration. Government Accounting Office 
surveys of DoD activities identified recent holding costs 
ranging from 11% to 23% of the total cost of the inventory 
annually.  (Linville, 1994) 
With fewer, more complex systems assigned to accomplish 
each mission, the ability to keep all systems battlefield- 
ready becomes directly linked to the management of the 
inventory of repair parts held at the O-Level repair facility. 
Blanchard describes the problem as viewed from the civilian 
sector: 
Too much inventory may ideally respond to the 
demand for spares. However, this may be costly, 
with a great deal of capital tied up in inventory. 
In addition, much waste could occur, particularly 
if system changes are implemented and certain 
components become obsolete. On the other hand, 
providing too little support results in the 
probability of causing the system to be inoperative 
due to stockout, which can also be costly. In 
general, it is desirable to obtain an economic 
balance...(Blanchard, 1992, p. 60) 
The cost of a stockout during military operations is 
measured in terms of failed or delayed missions. The process 
of balancing the cost of inventory against the cost of mission 
failure is, at best, complex and is least understood by those 
who suffer when stockout occurs. 
An equation that determines the appropriate number of 
repair parts requires several pieces of information. 
• An estimate of the time between ordering a repair 
part and actually receiving it is recorded as order 
and shipping time (O&ST). 
• The probability that the part will fail or be 
demanded by the O-Level user during O&ST. 
• The number of similar parts that the repair part is 
supporting. 
• The desired service level that the command intends 
for the system that the repair part supports: the 
probability that the part will be there when 
needed.  (Blanchard, 1992, p. 57) 
In equation form, this probability is: 
_j, R(-lnR)n  f where   R = e'KKt (1.1) 
n=0        n[ 
and where 
P = probability of having a particular repair part when 
required.  This is also called the protection level. 
S =  number of spare parts carried. 
R   =   reliability of the repair part, failures per unit 
time (t). 
K =  quantity of parts used in a system. 
With the exception of K, the population of similar parts, 
the correct values to use for this equation are not always 
easy to identify. Particularly, determining the desired 
service level, P, under the fiscal constraints of a budget 
requires the command to weigh mission success against 
available funds. In theory, achieving 100% probability that 
the part will be there when needed is never achievable over 
the long run at any cost. However, deciding that a 95% 
probability of the repair part being in-stock is acceptable, 
may mean you are accepting a 5% chance of a delayed or failed 
mission. As the inventory manager attempts to improve the in- 
stock probability, the associated costs increase exponentially 
with a per unit increase in protection level. 
SPCC generates an Allowance Parts List (APL) for most 
repairable equipment used in the Navy. The Coordinated 
Shipboard/Shorebased Allowance List (COSAL) is a compilation 
of all the APLs for an operational afloat command. The APL 
identifies all parts that the O-Level repair facility may use 
during authorized repairs. Additional parts are listed for 
repairs conducted at depot level. The type and quantity of 
parts authorized to be held in-stock at the O-Level are based 
upon historical demand/usage, the mission criticality of the 
part, the military criticality of the system, and the popula- 
tion of the potential failed part at the facility. 
When several systems using the same APL are maintained by 
the same O-Level maintenance facility, economies result from 
those systems using the same pool of inventory parts. SPCC 
relies on this advantage and lists the quantity of repair 
parts authorized dependent upon the number of similar systems 
maintained by the command. An example from the MK 16 APL for 
a Harness Retainer Pin is provided as Figure 1.1. The number 
of MK 16 maintained by the command identifies which column 
applies. If twenty MK 16 were being supported, the command 
would use the APL (9-20) column and maintain a stock of 19 
pins. 
ON BOARD ALLOWANCE TABLE 
ITEM NAME 1 
NUMBER 
OF EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS 
2            3            4          5-8        9-20 21-50 
RETAINER; HARNESS PIN 0 4 5 6 10 19 42 
Figure 1.1  Example of APL Column Listings, 
The assumption of a common maintenance facility and a 
shared inventory is critical to taking advantage of this 
economy. The policy becomes inadequate when operations 
require those systems (using a similar APL) to geographically 
separate and then operate from individual maintenance 
facilities. It is unlikely that we would separate systems 
from a unit like a ship and then expect that system to operate 
self-supported. However, it is common for small teams or 
detachments to share a common maintenance facility while in 
port, but to deploy independently. When the small teams or 
detachments do deploy, the APL/COSAL economies of scale 
collapse and each new maintenance facility is forced to 
operate with only a portion of the parent command's allowance; 
far short of what would have been allowed for whatever number 
of systems they have. Using the example in Figure 1.1, if a 
parent command with twenty systems were to establish five 
teams of four systems each, each team would be issued 20% of 
the parent command's APL allowance of 19, approximately four. 
If each team had been assigned its own APL, the allowance 
would have been six each. 
Assigning each team its own APL based on the number of 
systems assigned is certainly an option. Each team would 
maintain the SPCC allowance that permits self-sustaining 
operations whether at the parent command or deployed. 
A survey of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Units (EOD 
MU) indicated several techniques for repair parts inventory 
modeling. Each EOD MU acts as a parent command to several EOD 
Detachments (EOD Det) using the MK 16. The process of insti- 
tuting SPCC COSAL/APL support at these units is not complete 
at this date, contributing to the variety of techniques. Here 
are three examples. 
One technique, used by a command without APL support, is 
to model an allowance based upon their own demand experience. 
Each EOD Det with four MK 16 is issued their own command- 
modeled allowance and the model developed from the initial 
parts allowance recommended by the manufacturer for four MK 16 
when the systems were originally procured. This allowance was 
then augmented as indicated by the command's demand experi- 
ence. This command also deploys a complete MK 16 spare in a 
lay-up status for emergency use. 
A second technique, used by a command with APL support, 
is to issue a separate APL (4) column allowance for each EOD 
Det of four MK 16s. No spares are deployed and no additional 
parts are held by the parent command. 
A third method, also a command with APL support, is for 
the parent command to maintain a full APL allowance for the 
total aggregate number of systems assigned. In addition, each 
EOD Det maintains a separate APL (4) allowance for their four 
systems. This command also augments their EOD Dets by 
deploying two MK 16 spares in lay-up status. 
Inventory managers at parent commands struggle with the 
correct allocation of parts with a goal of attaining a service 
level that ensures mission success without going over budget. 
They often simply estimate the proportion of repair parts to 
distribute to deploying EOD Dets that would best support the 
deployers without causing a stockout for the parent command or 
leave the next deployer unsupported. This estimate, based 
upon experience and expectations, is often at odds with the 
expectations of the deploying EOD Dets. Whether because of 
actual or perceived failure of the APL modeled inventory, 
inventory managers almost universally exceed the SPCC 
allowance for repair parts. 
This thesis explores the application of a spreadsheet 
decision support model that assists inventory managers in 
selecting the best type and guantity of repair parts. Using 
demand data from SPCC and the formula described in equation 
(1.1), the inventory manager will have the flexibility to 
configure the repair parts allowance to meet the highest 
possible protection level within the constraints prescribed by 
the scenario. This flexibility has the potential to improve 
inventory design with both greater protection and lower costs. 
Although adaptable to several inventory problems, this 
spreadsheet will be modeled around the MK 16 scenarios 
described above. 
Chapter II will describe the MK 16 equipment and the 
supply linkage a MK 16 EOD Detachment uses for provisioning 
and resupply as compared to the techniques SPCC uses for APL 
calculations. Chapter III will provide the logic behind 
spreadsheet analysis and the functions within the decision 
support model. Chapter IV will compare the cost to protection 
level relationships of the proposed spreadsheet model with 
current inventory practices. Chapter V will summarize the 
results and provide conclusions and recommendations for 
improvements to the current methods of MK 16 repair parts 
inventory management. 
II.    BACKGROUND 
A.  MK 16 EQUIPMENT AND OPERATIONS 
1. Before the MK 16 
As the sophistication of ocean mines increases with 
modern electronics, so does the complexity of countering that 
threat. Modern ocean mines employ a combination of electronic 
sensors to identify their targets and to trigger their 
explosive charge at the critical moment. Many ocean mines are 
sensitive to acoustic, magnetic and seismic signals. 
As recently as 1986, Navy divers conducted MCM operations 
using Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) 
tanks and regulators similar to those seen in the early "Sea 
Hunt" TV shows. The only modification to the two-hose 
regulator and tanks was to construct them of nonmagnetic 
materials. The MK VI, a semi-closed circuit underwater 
breathing apparatus, was also in use and provided borderline 
magnetic and acoustic safety for the diver. However, logistic 
support was stopped for the MK VI in 1979 and only marginal 
mission capability was maintained.  (Walsh, 1989, p. 11) 
Open-circuit SCUBA is limited to short duration dives 
because each breath the diver takes is exhausted into the 
water. The maximum depth is limited by the only authorized 
breathing medium, compressed air (N202) , to 190 feet of 
seawater (FSW). Deeper than 190 FSW the nitrogen component 
(N2) becomes increasingly toxic through the narcotic effects 
of nitrogen narcosis. 
2. MK 16 Equipment 
Today, Navy MCM diving operations rely heavily on the MK 
16. (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2) The MK 16 meets military 
specifications for nonmagnetic and acoustically safe equipment 
and was designed primarily for MCM operations. The MK 16 is 
a closed circuit rebreather that recirculates the diver's 
Figure 2.1 MK16 MOD 0 Underwater Breathing 




























Figure 2.2 MK16 MOD 0 With Upper Housing Removed. 
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exhaled breath after removing the carbon dioxide (C02). The 
composition of the breathing medium is closely monitored by- 
battery-powered electronics. The electronics package 
maintains the optimum mix of breathing gases by automatically 
adding small amounts of oxygen (02) or diluent gas from high 
pressure bottles. The mix can also be overridden by the diver 
during emergencies by using manual controls. (O&M Manual, 
1990, p. 1-3) Pure oxygen is not used because of an 
increasing possibility of central nervous system oxygen 
toxicity when used deeper than 33 FSW. (Dive Manual, Vol. 
2, p. 9-3) The diluent gas removes the toxic characteristics 
of 02. Filtered air (N202) is used as diluent to a maximum 
depth of 150 FSW and a helium/oxygen mix (He02) is used to a 
maximum depth of 300 FSW. The Navy currently limits the MK 16 
to a maximum depth of 200 FSW because of the depth limitation 
of other support equipment required by the diver. Full 300 
FSW certification is expected in 1995. 
The closed circuit feature of the MK 16 greatly extends 
the time a diver can spend underwater. With the breathing gas 
recirculated and not expelled, diving duration is primarily 
limited by the ability of the absorbent canister to remove the 
C02 from the breathing medium. Depending upon the diluent gas 
used and the water temperature, the MK 16 is capable of 
supporting a diver for up to 300 minutes to a depth of 300 
FSW. 
3.   MK 16 Procurements 
The same closed-circuit, low acoustic and nonmagnetic 
features that make MK 16 effective with MCM operations also 
lend themselves to application by the Naval Special Warfare 
(SPECWAR) teams. EOD units have used the MK 16 operationally 
since 1986; SPECWAR units since 1993. Scheduled procurement 
of MK 16 over the next two years will raise the inventory to 
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617 units fielded with EOD and SPECWAR teams. The current 
contract cost is $32,000 per unit; about $20,000,000 total. 
An Operations Support Kit (OSK) containing test equipment 
and an inventory of repair parts to support deployed opera- 
tions is procured in the same contract. EOD issues one OSK to 
each group of four MK 16. SPECWAR uses one OSK for five MK 
16. There will be approximately 125 OSK in the field by the 
end of 1996 at a cost of about $32,000 each, $3,750,000 total. 
The MK 16 is a critical system in the growing concern of 
MCM and SPECWAR diving operations. As MK 16 procurement 
continues, repair parts management will become more critical 
to the readiness of the deployed detachments and to the 
budgets of the parent commands. 
4.   MK 16 Operations 
MK 16-equipped EOD Dets are configured, (the number of 
divers and MK 16), by their parent commands to match the 
mission. The US Navy Diving Manual (p. 15-12) sets the lowest 
number of MK 16 for MK 16 required missions at two. A single, 
tended diver can conduct underwater operations while the 
second diver stands by ready to deploy in emergency. 
Although unlikely in operational scenarios, the standby diver 
could use other diving equipment (SCUBA) if the operation that 
the primary diver is involved in does not require the MCM 
characteristics of MK 16 and does not exceed the depth limits 
of the standby's equipment. 
Many EOD commands prefer the option of using two divers 
working underwater as a team, with a third diver as the 
standby diver. It is unusual to use more than two divers in 
the water at the same time other than in training situations. 
With three then established as the mission essential minimum 
of operational MK 16, additional MK 16 are routinely deployed 
in combinations of ready service spares (RSS) and spares in 
lay-up. 
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The ready service spare is used universally as an on- 
scene replacement for a malfunctioning MK 16. The RRS is 
assembled and tested at the beginning of the diving day along 
with those that will be the primary and standby diver's MK 16. 
All four MK 16 will be stationed at the dive site for 
immediate use during the operation. The RSS will not normally 
be used unless one of the other three MK 16 fails. 
Any spares in addition to the three MK 16 in use and the 
fourth as a RRS are maintained in a lay-up status at the 
maintenance facility along with the inventory of repair parts. 
If a failure occurs during the diving day, repairs are 
conducted at the end of the day when the divers return to the 
maintenance facility. 
When MK 16 fails, EOD Dets follow this general decision 
tree to resolve the failure: 
1. If repair parts are in-stock and the repair is not 
extensive, repairs are made immediately. The 
failed MK 16 is returned to a ready status, and any 
repair parts used are immediately reordered. 
2. If repair parts are in-stock but the repair is 
extensive and not practical to accomplish before 
the next required mission, check to see if there is 
a spare in lay-up. 
3. If there is a spare in lay-up, bring it to a ready 
status. Repair the down MK 16 at the earliest 
opportunity and immediately reorder parts. 
4. If there is no spare in lay-up, delay the mission 
until repairs can be accomplished, or attempt the 
mission without the fourth MK 16 as RSS. 
5. If the repair parts are not in-stock, check to see 
if there is a spare in lay-up. If there is a spare 
in lay-up, bring the spare to a ready status and 
order the repair parts through normal supply 
priorities (a CASREP is not permitted). 
6. If there is no spare in lay-up, order the repair 
parts along with a CASREP reporting decreased 
12 
mission readiness, and delay the mission until 
repairs can be accomplished, or attempt the mission 
without the fourth MK 16 as RSS. 
A CASREP status of less than fully mission capable would 
be justified only if less than four MK 16 were fully func- 
tional. So long as failures were supported by the repair 
parts inventory and spare MK 16 were available when the 
inventory did not support the failure, no CASREP would be 
generated. 
B.  THE SPCC MODEL 
1.   Computation Model Determination 
The methods SPCC uses at provisioning conferences, and as 
described below, are simplified versions of a more complex 
computer program, the Fleet Logistics Support Improvement 
Program (FLSIP), but result in quantities very near the 
ultimate computed quantity listed in the APL. (SPCCINST 
4400.30c) By limiting the process description to the case of 
MK 16, several complications that affect other systems can be 
eliminated. Minimum replacement unit (MRU), planned 
maintenance requirement (PMR), and technical overrides (TOR) 
are not involved with the MK 16 computation and can be 
overlooked. MRU represents the minimum number of the repair 
parts required to accomplish a repair: for MK 16, all MRU are 
one. There are no PMR, indicating that parts are not normally 
required for planned maintenance. Also, there are no TOR, 
indicating there are no technical decisions that would 
override the guantities computed. 
The inputs required to determine quantity are: 
• POP:  Number of MK 16 assigned multiplied by the 
number of that component in one MK 16. 
• MCC:  Mission Criticality Code.  The importance of 
the MK 16 to the (EOD/USN) mission. 
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• MEC: Military Essentiality Code. The importance 
of each repair part to the operation of the MK 16. 
Repair part MEC 1 = essential, MEC 3 = not 
essential. 
• BRF: Best Replacement Factor. BFR =0.03 means 3 
out of 100 will fail in one year. Computed from 
actual fleet demand. 
• Demand Based Item: Expected demand is at least one 
in 90 days. 
• Insurance Item: Expected demand is less than one 
in 90 days but item is required because of high MEC 
and/or MCC. 
BRF is developed from the initial Technical Replacement 
Factor (TRF) estimated by the manufacturer during procurement. 
Once repair parts are provisioned based on TRF, the value is 
continuously modified based on actual demand from the fleet. 
This demand includes all manner of consumption of the repair 
parts: actual failure, loss in shipping, theft, incorrect 
maintenance, etc. A two year demand development period (DDP) 
is the target for complete transition from TRF to BRF. 
(OPNAVINST 4423.5, Encl. 4, p. 1) With the POP determined 
quantitatively and BRF determined statistically, SPCC needs 
determination by the field engineering service activity of MCC 
and MEC. MK 16 has been assigned a MCC of 3, where 1 is the 
lowest and 4 equates to capital ships and nuclear submarines. 
The MEC for all MK 16 repair parts is either 1 or 3, where 1 
is essential and 3 is not essential. Our primary concern is 
with those parts deemed essential to the operation of the MK 
16, thus non-essential parts will not be considered in this 
thesis. This input of MEC = 1 and MCC = 3 is then applied to 
the Mission Criticality Code Matrix provided by Navy Fleet 
Material Support Office (FMSO) to arrive at a final computed 
MCC = 3. The computed MCC value, 3, permits APL quantities to 
be derived from Table IA or Table II: MODFLSIP located in 
SPCCINSTRUCT 4400.30, p. 1D3-31)  (computed MCC 1 or 2 uses 
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FLSIP). Both SPCC Table IA and II provide similar results. 
The significant difference is that Table IA uses annual 
replacement factor on the Y-axis and POP on the X-axis where 
Table II uses a formula that corrects the annual replacement 
factor for quarterly demand and POP: 
(BRF * P0P)/4 = 90-day expected demand (SPCC Table 
II Factor) . SPCC Table II is based on 90-day 
expected demand and is converted to the quantity 
allowance. 
MODFLSIP identifies both demand based items and insurance 
items (quantities marked with * on the APL) . For demand 
items, enter the SPCC Table II with a 90-day expected demand 
greater than 1: 
(BRF * POP)/4 > 1, enter SPCC Table II with this 
factor: example, Factor = 1.9, APL quantity 
allowance = 4. 
Insurance items are those critical parts (MEC 1) that are 
permitted under MODFLSIP guidelines when the SPCC Table II 
factor is less than 1.00. Insurance items are provided to 
protect against failures when demand history is uncertain and 
for failures that might occur as the system ages. If the 90- 
day expected demand is less than 0.025, no parts are 
authorized; in the range of 0.025 to 0.49, and if the item is 
considered an insurance item, then the APL quantity is one. 
If the 90-day expected demand is 0.50 to 0.999, the APL 
quantity is two. Beyond 0.999, the item is defined as a 
demand item. 
2.   Current MK 16 Protection Level Determination 
FLSIP and MODFLSIP Models are based on the Poisson 
distribution and provide an advertised 90% protection against 
stockout of any single item over a 90-day period. (SPCC 
4400.30C, p. 1D3-33)   The protection level is actually a 
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minimum of 90% for APL (1), (2), (3), and (4) columns and is 
about 90% for the mean number of systems for the other 
columns. In all cases the protection level is not uniform for 
all expected demands. A uniform protection level would only 
be possible if repair parts were able to be issued in less 
than whole units. Figure 2.3 shows the protection level as 
over 0.98 for items with an expected demand of less than 
0.025. This interprets as those items with a small demand 
will likely not be demanded over the 90-day period. At an 
expected demand of 0.025, the MODFLSIP permits one repair part 
(for those parts considered critical). This level of coverage 
provides a protection level exceeding 0.99. From this point 
on the graph, the protection level drops as the expected 
demand increases until the model allows an additional repair 
part at an expected demand of 0.50. With the extra repair 
part, protection level climbs to over 0.985 from a low of 
about 0.935. This cycle repeats itself with each additional 
discrete repair part authorized. 
The SPCC MODFLSIP Table II also lists the number of 
repair parts authorized for demand based items. Regardless of 
MEC, a 90-day expected demand of 1.00 or more is authorized at 
least 2 repair parts. Items with the expected demand less 
than 1.00 are reviewed for MEC. This thesis focuses on only 
vital parts, MEC = 1. Repair parts with MEC = 1 but with a 
90-day expected demand of less than 1.00 but more than 0.025 
are authorized as insurance items. Figure 2.3 shows a 
significantly greater protection against stockout for these 
insurance items (0.995 to 0.999 for insurance items and 0.907 
to 0.995 for demand items). All but thirteen O-Level repair 
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90 Day Expected Demand 
-Achieved Protection Level 
A- - • SPCC Parts Authorization 
Figure 2.3 SPCC Parts Authorization Protection Level 
for 90-Day Expected Demand to Support One 
Item. 
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Some assumptions implied by the APL quantities directly 
affect the accuracy of the protection levels derived from the 
90-day expected demand figures: 
1. The demand figures from the fleet require prompt 
reordering to be reflected in BRF. When parts 
stockpiles are allowed to be depleted and not 
reordered because of budget constraints, the input 
to SPCC indicates an inaccurate picture of demand 
for the repair part. Waiting for a new fiscal 
year's funding might show zero demand for more than 
one fiscal quarter. The initial spares provided in 
the OSK could dramatically reduce the apparent 
demand if not kept restocked as originally 
issued. 
2. The 90-day expected demand calculation is based on 
the cold war assumption that a major conflict would 
cause gaps in our supply lead times of as many as 
90 days. APLs were designed to provide all the 
parts required for operations during this 90-day 
lead time with a 90% in-stock probability planned 
for each part. With the close of the cold war and 
the likelihood of speedy resupply by air and sea 
this lead time is probably closer to 30 to 60 
days. 
3. The 90-day expected demand was also based upon 
historical usage. In the recent history of the US 
Navy since the introduction of MK 16, high OPTEMPO 
calendar quarters that reflect wartime demands have 
not been common. Peacetime demands reflect an 
average MK 16 usage of 15 to 25 days per quarter. 
During Desert Storm, one EOD Det dove over 70 days 
in one quarter. However, this high usage gets lost 
when averaged with the typical peacetime demands. 
Unlike the systems of typical fleet units, the MK 
16 is used intermittently for training until major 
exercises and Desert Storm scenarios develop. When 
an EOD Det packs up for war, which expected demand 
should they anticipate? 
3.   0.5 + FLSIP 
SPCC recently introduced a new model for APL calculations 
that takes advantage of the decreased resupply lead times 
expected post-cold war.  In the 0.5+ FLSIP model, the level of 
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insurance for critical items is reduced. Where MODFLSIP 
allowed one repair part if the 90-day expected demand was 
0.025 to 0.49 and two repair parts for 0.50 to 1.00, the 0.5 + 
FILSIP permits one repair part for a 90-day expected demand of 
0.125 to 1.00. To compensate for this dramatic reduction in 
insurance items, SPCC uses a combination of 3M and CASREP data 
to create demand selection rules that add back allowance items 
that increase protection level at the least cost. 
(Eggenberger, p. 13) In addition to adding back some items, 
those items removed from 0-Level inventories are to be 
consolidated at shore based facilities that could expedite 
resupply with a reduced lead time. 
4.   The Impact Of MK 16 Spares 
As described in the Introduction, it is common for EOD 
Dets to deploy with additional MK 16 in lay-up for use in 
emergency.  This emergency could be in the form of: 
• Repair parts not in-stock to repair a down MK 16. 
• Repair parts in-stock but mission requirements do 
not permit immediate repair. 
• The repairs are beyond the capability of the unit. 
When the spare MK 16 is taken out of lay-up and the down 
MK 16 is taken out of service, the spare can be viewed in a 
variety of ways. First, the spare is truly only a box of 
repair parts that happen to be one MK 16 when assembled. In 
this form the spare is available for cannibalization but is 
usually used as a full-up replacement for the down MK 16. 
This then makes the down rig available for cannibalization, 
with the exception of the failed part. Cannibalization is 
common when operational units are faced with the alternative 
of cancelling a mission. Officially, cannibalization is 
prohibited and it may have further detrimental effects on the 
system.  (Blanchard, 1992, p. 335)  Second, the entire spare 
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MK 16 is acting only as the single part that was required to 
fix the other MK 16; that is, the entire $42,000 spare MK 16 
was held in lay-up to protect against a stockout of what might 
have been an inexpensive repair part. 
The policies of SPCC, and those of the individual 
inventory managers, are compromises that hope to reach an 
optimal solution in the face of a wide variety of constraints 
that change from month to month. The proposed spreadsheet 
model provides a tool to deal with these rapidly changing 
demands. In Chapter III, we will present the methodology of 
a basic spreadsheet decision support tool that will help 
inventory managers relate these varied constraints and respond 
to future changes as soon as they are known. 
20 
III.   SPREADSHEET DECISION SUPPORT MODEL 
A.  INTRODUCTION TO SPREADSHEETS 
Vazsonyi (1993) well states the advantages and the 
potential of spreadsheets. We have used his thoughts 
throughout this section while adapting them more specifically 
to this case. 
One of the tenets of W. E. Demming is that no matter how 
dedicated, the worker cannot produce quality that on the 
average exceeds the quality of what the process is capable of 
producing (Heizer, 1993, p. 738) . This focus on improving the 
process has contributed to the growth of Management Sciences/ 
Operation Research (MS/OR) techniques and models. MS/OR rely 
upon a variety of mathematical, statistical and many other 
analytical tools in an inter-disciplinary approach to process 
improvement (Heizer, 1993, p. 4) . The major barrier to the 
incorporation of MS/OR is the lack of command and operations 
level personnel comfortable with algebra, classical 
mathematics, and probabilities. Spreadsheets build the bridge 
between MS/OR and the user. Spreadsheets are the easiest, 
most powerful, and general purpose management tools available 
for doing basic numerical analysis. Their power is reflected 
most in the ability the user gains in proposing "what if" 
scenarios. Given a scenario as in the MK 16 inventory model 
with five variables and over 100,000 possible combinations, 
entering the complex formula long hand becomes a tremendous 
though not impossible chore. A spreadsheet consolidates the 
multiple mathematical steps required and updates all of the 
dependent (outcomes) variables automatically when one of the 
input parameters is changed. This ability to experiment, by 
changing the input and seeing the effect immediately, helps 
the user develop an intuitive feel for the relationships 
between the inputs and output. 
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SPCC's spreadsheet equivalent converts the outputs of 
their complex and dynamic mathematical model into tables like 
the APL. However, once committed to hardcopy, the model 
looses its flexibility and becomes two-dimensional: we enter 
the appropriate column for the number of MK 16 assigned 
(input), move our finger down to the line of the repair part 
in question, and receive the number of repair parts authorized 
(outcome). SPCC's compromise can only be improved upon with 
the advent of the widespread use of personal computers and 
spreadsheets than can be customized for the individual 
requirements of a command. 
B.  METHODOLOGY FOR THE MK 16 REPAIR PARTS SPREADSHEET 
We have selected 78 repair parts that cover over 80% of 
the inventory costs; this allows us to narrow the scope from 
the total 184 critical parts identified in the APL (See Table 
3.1.) This allows us to focus on those items that are the 
greatest burden to a command's budget. Additionally, the 
repair parts have been tailored to these criteria: 
• No consumables, like sensors or pads, and no parts 
that might be viewed as repair parts yet are 
employed operationally, like He02 vessels. 
• All have a history of demand with SPCC. 
The 78 repair parts selected for evaluation cover most of 
the items costing more than $20.00. The most costly items 
cost more than $6,000.00. A selection of these repair parts 
in quantities recommended by SPCC for an EOD Det with four MK 
16 costs $46,131; $51,201 for a EOD MU with nine to twenty MK 
16. 
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Table 3.1   List of MK 16 MOD O Repair 
Parts Selected for Review. 
Item 
" DWRG # 
Selected Repair Parts 






























GASKET, HOSE CONN 
INLINE FILT ASSY 
CLAMP, HOSE NO 1 










HOSE, AIR BREATHING 
OX HI PRESS GAGE ASSY 
SCREW, MACH, BLEED 
VALVE CHECK 

































SCREW, MACH.PHD «6 
CENTER SECTION 
CONN HSG ASSY ELEC 
DIAPHRAM 

























BATT CONT BRD ASSY 
SCREW, MACH.PHD «6_ 
SCREW, MACH, PNH 
VALVE, HANDWHEEL 
DIL VALVE ASSY 
TUBE ASSY, INLFIL-T 
H5980-01-297-0920 SECONDARY DISP ASSY 
M5961-01-297-0949 PRI DISPLAY ASSY 











VALVE, CHECK ASSY 
REG DIL ASSY 



































$   1,810.00 
298.00 
4,060.00 
$      495.00 
$   1,234.00 
DIL REG ASSY 
OXY REG ASSY 
BYPASS VALV ASSY DIL 
BODY, VALVE SUBASSY 
BYPASS VALV ASSY OXY 
LID, CANISTER 
SCREW, MACH 
PRI ELECTRONIC DISP 







H4810-01-297-5976 OXY ADDITION VALVE 




WAIST STRAP ASSY RT 
COVER ASSY 
WAIST STRAP ASSY LEFT 
SHOULD STRAP LEFT 
$   2,040.00 
$   2,040.00 
%   1,600.00 



















$   6,390.00 
3.70 
$   6,010.00 
$   1,050.00 
$      396.00 
375.00 
































































Table  3.1   (Continued) 
45   1   6196011 H5935-01-296-5829 FLTG, BHD, ASSY, ELEC $      706.00 0.035  0.035 1 1 





47 6196126 M4710-01-297-0995 TUBE ASSY, DIL REG $      478.00 0.035 !  0.035 0.035 
1 
48 6195996 M4710-01-297-0994 TUBE ASSY, FL CTRL, OX $      397.00 0.035 1 
49 6195998 M4710-O1-297-O997 TUBE ASSY, DIL BP SC $      396.00 0.035 0.035 1 
50 6195802- M4710-01-297-0991 TUBE ASSY, DIL REG TO $      350.00 0.035 0.035 1 
51 6195767 M4710-01-297-0998 TUBE ASSY, DIL S T T S $      350.00 0.035 0.035 1 
52 6195991 M4710-01-297-0999 TUBE ASSY, DIL S T TO $      342.00 0.035 
1 0.035 1 












M5310-01-297-0889 NUT, ACORN $          5.80 0.005 0.035 1 
56 6195983 M1386-01-304-7142 MOUTHPIECE $   1,560.00 0.031 0.031 1 ' 
67 6195989 M5325-01-297-0899 GROMMET, NONMETALLI $        11.00 0.01 0.03 1 ' 
58 6195990 M4710-01-296-5981 TUBE ASSY. DIL ADD $      148.00 0.028 0.028 1 .   '   .. 
69 6195984 M5305-01-296-5812 NUT, JAM SMALL PATTER $          5.80 0.005 0.025 Ü —7— 






















CAP, SECONDARY DISP 
FUSEHOLDER 
SCREW, MACH.FH.820 
f      709.00 
$       180.00 
$         24.00 
$        22.50 
$          6.20 
$          4.20 

















































NUT, SECONDARY DISPL 
RING, RETAIN, THRD UPP 
RETAINER, D:PLATE BASE 
COVER, BATT ASSY 
BODY, VALVE 
SPRING, COMPRESSION 
BUTTON ASSY, OXY 
$        61.00 
$        28.50 
$      163.00 
$        73.00 
$          7.50 
$         5.00 
$        78.00 













































BU 1 1 UN A5JJ> T, LML 
SCREW, MACH. MNH#10 
CABLE ASSY. 02 VALVE 
SUPPORT BASE ASSY 
$         3.70 
$      456.00 
















C.  INPUTS TO THE SPREADSHEET 
1.   Population:  "Number of MK 16 (active)" 
For the APL, SPCC uses the repair part's 90-day expected 
demand to generate the quantities authorized for 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5-8, 9-20, and 21-50 populations. As an example, the APL 
Listing for a retainer pin is provided in Figure 1.1. 
By adding a fifth MK 16, a 25% increase in systems, the 
inventory of retainer pins had to be increased from six to 
ten, a 66% increase in costs. A protection level identical to 
that for four MK 16 might be achieved with only one additional 
part. The jump from six retainer pins to ten was to permit 
grouping of the systems. The number of systems are grouped to 
permit quick approximate calculations without an unwieldy 
document that lists the quantity individually for each of one 
to fifty systems. Instead, with 10 parts authorized, those 
commands with five MK 16 have a much higher protection level 
than the commands with eight MK 16, though their costs are the 
same. This difference is more pronounced in the APL (9-20) 
column. Figure 3.1 displays the relationship between the 
protection levels, provided by an inventory based on the APL 
(9-20) column, that an EOD MU would experience as the number 
of assigned MK 16 increases. The EOD MU with nine MK 16 
maintains an average protection level of 0.993 with no repair 
part at less than 0.970; well above the SPCC goal of 0.900. 
As the number of assigned MK 16 increases to twenty the 
protection drops to an average of 0.956. More important, the 
minimum protection level within the inventory has dropped to 
0.758; several of the high demand items are significantly 
below the SPCC goal. 
Another assumption supporting the grouping of the larger 
populations of systems is the likelihood of redundant systems. 
If an EOD MU with twenty MK 16 routinely held several in 
lay-up, the protection provided by the APL (9-20) column could 
be adequate. 
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10       11 
-t- 
12       13       14       15       16       17 
Number of MK 16 Assigned 
18 
-APL Minimum Protection Level 
-Spreadsheet Minimum Protection Level 
-APL Average Protection Level 
- Spreadsheet Average Protection Level 
Figure 3.1  Comparison of Protection for the APL (9-20) 
Column and the Spreadsheet Model Inventory- 
as the Number of MK 16 Assigned Changes from 
9 to 20 (Spreadsheet Costs s APL Costs). 
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With the proposed spreadsheet model the incremental 
calculation is quick and exact in increments of one; this 
avoids the dilemma of the inventory manager on the cusp of a 
grouping. Additional, the spreadsheet permits the calculation 
to be made based on the exact number of active MK 16 and not 
on approximations. 
The calculation for the spreadsheet that allows the exact 
number of repair parts to be generated for the number of MK 16 
maintained is: 
BRF * POP in one MK 16 * Number of MK 16 (active) 
The number of repair parts in one MK 16 is carried with 
each repair part's description and is included automatically 
when the repair part is reviewed for BRF. The BRF is from 
SPCC and the "Number of MK 16 (active) " is inputted by the 
operator from the spreadsheet's Control Panel screen. (See 
sample spreadsheet Control Panel in Figure 3.2). The 
inventory manager must only determine how many MK 16 will be 
supported by this inventory. Two detachments deploying 
together with the same task should not use their aggregate 
I Dmtartinn Level /Costs Relationship Enter Lead Time (Other Inputs as Selected) 
Estimate (1 to 90 Days) = 90 
Enter OPTEMPO Estimate 
(X Peacetime) = 1 $55,000  -i 
$50,000  - 
$45,000  - 
$40,000  . 





$10,000  ■ 
Enter Minimum Protection 




OfMK16{layup) = 0 
Inventory Cost of 
Protection Level = $44,726 
Penalty Cost of One Spare $42,000 
Total Cost = | $44,726 
Print 
Report 
C                     i 
Update 
Chart 
/ p—•—i i—•—' r^ S5.000 
0.S KM o.s 10        0.920        0.930        0940        0.950        0.960        0.970        0.980        0.990 
{             Print Scenario 
M odel will chanqe service level to 0.99 9 when "Update Chart" is selected   Reenter Minimum Protection Level desired before printinq. 
Figure 3.2  View of Spreadsheet Control Panel. 
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population unless their is no chance that the inventory might 
need to be split. 
2.   Spares:  "Number of MK 16 (in lay-up)" 
The actual cost of a single MK 16 that a command would 
use as spare in lay-up for a deployment is difficult to 
include as a cost of inventory. Given that the quantity of MK 
16 issued to each command is determined and funded at a higher 
level, the cost to the command is negligible when compared to 
supporting  a  $100,000  repair parts  inventory  and  its 
associated holding costs.  An EOD Det can eliminate the need 
for an inventory if there are enough MK 16 as spares in lay- 
up.  If lead times are short enough and OPTEMPO was low, a 
single spare MK 16 could substitute for a down MK 16 until the 
repair part was received through the supply pipeline:  no 
repair parts inventory would be required.  This would be a 
more valid assumption if cannibalization was intended.  The 
down MK 16 becomes the inventory of repair parts with each 
cannibalized repair part immediately reordered.  The primary 
goal is to have four fully operational MK 16, but a secondary 
goal would be to repair the down MK 16.  The presence of 
inactive or spare MK 16 is not assumed by the SPCC model in 
determining POP and BRF, but is assumed in the grouping of 
systems in APL columns  (5-8)  and  (9-20) .   The proposed 
spreadsheet model can simulate the effect of spare MK 16 by 
entering the number of spares in the "Number of MK 16 (in lay- 
up) " block.   Each spare indicated reduces the number of 
inventory parts required by one each.  This implies perfect 
cannibalization and lacks any true cost penalty. The "Cost of 
One MK 16" can be changed as the inventory manager wishes to 
reflect actual replacement cost or other penalty costs.  The 
equation that incorporates the penalty cost as a cost of 
inventory is: 
(Cost of One MK 16 * Number in lay-up) + (Inventory Cost 
of Protection Level) = Total Cost 
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3. Lead Time 
The lead time assumed by the SPCC MODFLSIP model is 90 
days. The formula used in the spreadsheet provides the 
inventory manager the flexibility to change this to match 
various scenarios and then see the effects of the change on 
protection level, cost, and the mix of parts required. The 
inventory manager can provision the EOD Det for a full six 
month deployment expecting no resupply, or support a detach- 
ment with access to overnight delivery service. 
The APL figures are generated by dividing the annual 
demand BRF by four to arrive at a figure that reflects a 90- 
day demand. 
90-day Expected Demand = (BRF * POP)/4 
To allow the flexibility to find the demand for any 
selected time period, the number of days estimated by the 
inventory manager, "Enter Lead time Estimate," is divided by 
3 65 and then multiplied by the annual BRF. 
Expected demand in n  days = (BRF * POP * n)/365 
4. OPTEMPO 
The demand SPCC recognizes for a repair part is directly 
tied to the number of repair parts ordered per quarter. MK 16 
repair parts usage is averaged over ten quarters. High order 
rates, because of changes to ordering practices or wartime 
usage, are smoothed with low OPTEMPO peacetime operations. An 
inventory manager provisioning for Desert Storm may want to 
reflect a higher OPTEMPO. Because SPCC is looking at a fleet- 
wide demand, comparing one command's OPTEMPO to that of the 
fleet may not be completely proportional. Although one 
command may typically operate their twenty MK 16 only five or 
six days each per month, a training command may operate all 
twenty MK 16 fifteen days per month. Once the inventory 
manager is comfortable with the estimated OPTEMPO, it must be 
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converted into a proportion of SPCC's ten-quarter average 
OPTEMPO. If the estimate is that the EOD Det will be 
operating at four times the normally expected OPTEMPO, enter 
four in "Enter OPTEMPO Estimate," one-half the normal fleet 
OPTEMPO, enter 0.50. This formula ties OPTEMPO into the BRF 
calculation: 
Expected demand in n  days adjusted for OPTEMPO = 
(BRF * POP * Enter OPTEMPO Estimate * n)/365 
5.   Protection Level 
The protection level in some models is the function of 
the inputs rather than being one of the inputs. The proposed 
spreadsheet model allows the user to approach from two ways. 
If the user wishes to commit to a particular service level for 
the sake of consistency or to document the limitations of the 
budget, the protection level can be entered as such. A second 
approach available is to graph all the possible protection 
levels against the costs for each, based upon the other 
selected inputs. An example would be: given the inputs 
selected for 90-day lead time, OPTEMPO = 2, four active and no 
lay-up MK 16, what is the graphic trade-off between protection 
level and costs? This is described in greater detail under 
"Outputs." 
D.  OUTPUTS 
1.   "Inventory Cost of Protection Level" 
The spreadsheet's Control Panel provides the user with 
the ability to build a scenario and immediately view the 
results. After inputting the "Minimum Protection Level," 
"OPTEMPO," "Number of MK 16 (active)" and "Number of MK 16 (in 
lay-up)," the user can select a protection level and see the 
resultant "Total Cost." By clicking on "Update Chart" the 
user can see a graphic representation of the relationship 
between the range of protection levels from 0.895 to 0.995 and 
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the associated costs. The user can then select from the graph 
the protection level where the marginal gain in protection 
level is most favorable within the budget constraints 
prescribed to get the exact cost of that protection. The 
Control Panel graph in Figure 3.1 is automatically generated 
within the spreadsheet based upon inputs displayed (all 
protection levels are plotted regardless of the input values) 
when the user clicks on the "Update Chart" button. Where the 
graph is steep, there is a high cost penalty for a modest 
increase in protection level. Conversely, where the graph is 
flat there is a large gain in protection with each additional 
dollar. This scenario can be printed by clicking on the 
button "Print Scenario." 
2.   Repair Parts List 
At any point that the user wishes to view the actual list 
of repair parts and quantities generated by the scenario and 
protection level, a hard copy can be printed by clicking on 
the "Print Report" button. The report for the Figure 3.2 
scenario is provided in Table 3.2. 
E.  THE INTERNAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SPREADSHEET 
Once the user has selected the inputs that make up the 
scenario, the spreadsheet processes them internally through a 
series of mathematical steps. First, a cumulative Poisson 
distribution table, driven by the scenario, is generated for 
each repair part. Each repair part's annual BRF is adjusted 
for the user's inputs to arrive at a probability of failure 
during the "Lead Time" selected. The cumulative Poisson table 
is arrayed in columns from zero to ten. The heading for each 
column (zero to ten) reflects the number of repair parts 
required to achieve the protection levels in that column. The 
cumulative probabilities below the heading, of three for 
example, reflect the probability that there would be three or 
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NUN            1 Nomenclature                    | Unit Cost   1 Quantity j Total Cost REPAIR PARTS 
M5340-01 -298-3012 CATCH, CLAMPING S      23.00 !        3 S            69.00 SUMMARY 
M5310-01-297-5909 GASKET, HOSE CONN S        4.80 |        3 $            14.40 I 
M4240-01-298-3005 INLINE FILT ASSY $    254.00 |        3 $          762.00 Leadtime =     90 
OPTEMPO =      1 
Protection =   0.971 
#MK 16 (Active) =      4 
#MK 16 (Lay-up) =      0 
M4730-01 -296-5863 CLAMP, HOSE NO 1 $      11.50 |        2 $            23.00 
M4730-01-297-0908 CLAMP, HOSE NO 2 S      11.50 !        2 $            23.00 
M4720-01-297-5982 HOSE. AIR BREATHING $        9.00 |        2 $            18.00 
H6685-01-297-0965 OX HI PRESS GAGE ASSY $ 1,430.00 |        2 $       2,860.00 
M5305-01-296-5797 SCREW, MACH, BLEED S      17.50 |        1 $            17.50 I 
M4820-01 -298-3011 VALVE CHECK $      10.50 I        1 $            10.50 I 
M5360-01-298-2994 SPRING, HLCL, CPRSN S        6.90 |        1 $              6.90 
M5305-01-299-9746 SCREW, SHOULDER $      11.00 !        1 $            11.00 
M4730-01-297-5960 FITTING, FEMALE $      92.00 j        1 $             92.00 
M4730-01-297-5960 FITTING, FEMALE $      92.00 i        1 $             92.00 
M5305-01-296-5799 SCREW, MACH.PHO #6 S         3.70 I         1 $               3.70 
H5915-01-296-5892 ICENTER SECTION $ 4,060.00 j         1 $        4,060.00 
H5935-01-295-9130   CONN HSG ASSY ELEC S 2,480.00 I        1 $        2,480.00 
M4820-01-295-9266 |DIAPHRAM $       76.00 |         1 $             76.00 
M534O-01-297-0909 | CLAMP, LOOP ASSY $      19.00 I        1 $             19.00 
M5935-01 -295-9129 JBATT CONT BRD ASSY $      37.00 I        1 $             37.00 
M5305-01-296-5800 |SCREW, MACH,PHO#6 $        3.70 i        1 $              3.70 
M5305-01-295-9121  I SCREW, MACH, PNH $        3.70 I        1 $              3.70 
M5340-01-296-5904 VALVE, HANDWHEEL S      22.50 I        1 $            22.50 
H8120-01-297-0901 DIL VALVE ASSY $ 1,810.00 !        1 $        1,810.00 
M4710-01 -300-9986 TUBE ASSY, INL FIL-T $    298.00 i        1 $          298.00 | 
H5980-01-297-0920 SECONDARY DISP ASSY $ 4.06Ö.00 I        1 $       4,060.00 | 
M5961-01-297-0949 PRI DISPLAY ASSY            I $    495.00 !        1 $          495.00 I 
M4820-01-298-2826 VALVE. CHECK ASSY          $1,234.00!        1 $       1,234.00 1 
H4820-O1 -295-9157 REG DIL ASSY $ 2,040.00 i        1 $       2,040.00 
H4820-01-295-9158 OXY REG MTD ASSY         i $ 2,040.00 I        1 $       2,040.00 
H4820-01-295-9155 DIL REG ASSY                     I S 1.600.00 i         1 S       1.600.00 I 
H4820-01-295-9156 OXY REG ASSY S 1,600.00 i        1 $        1,600.00 1 
H4820-01-299-9859 BYPASS VALV ASSY DIL S    606.00 j        1 $          606.00 
M4820-01-296-5887 BODY, VALVE SUBASSY S      49.00 !        1 $            49.00 
H4820-01-299-9860 BYPASS VALV ASSY OXY $    736.00 I        1 $           736.00 
M5340-01-297-5955 LID, CANISTER $    164.00 j        1 $           164.00 
M5305-01-296-5801 SCREW, MACH S        3.70 I        1 $               3.70 
H5998-01-297-0946 PRI ELECTRONIC DISP $ 6,390.00 I        1 $        6,390.00 
M5305-01-296-5796 SCREW, MACH,FH.82#6 $        3.70 I        1 $               3.70 
H4810-01-297-5976 OXY ADDITION VALVE $ 6,010.00 |        1 $       6,010.00 
H4820-01-297-5977 OXY VALVE REG $ 1,050.00 I        1 $       1,050.00 
M5340-01-296-5838 WAIST STRAP ASSY RT $    396.00 |        1 $           396.00 
M5340-01-299-9780 COVER ASSY S    375.00 I        1 $          375.00 
M5340-01-299-9781 WAIST STRAP ASSY LEF $    369.00 I        1 $           369.00 
M5340-01 -297-0986 SHOULD STRAP LEFT $    111.00 i        1 $          111.00 
H5935-01-296-5829 FLTG, BHD, ASSY, ELEC $    706.00 I        1 $          706.00 I 
M4710-01-297-0924 TUBE ASSY $    497.00 I        1 $          497.00 
M4710-01-297-0995 TUBE ASSY, DIL REG $    478.00 !        1 $          478.00 
M4710-01-297-0994 TUBE ASSY, FL CTRL, OX $    397.00 I        1 $          397.00 
M4710-01-297-0997 TUBE ASSY, DIL BP SC $    396.00 |        1 $          396.00 
M4710-01-297-0991 TUBE ASSY, DIL REG TO $    350.00 I        1 $          350.00 
M4710-01-297-0998 TUBE ASSY, DIL S T T S $    350.00 |        1 $          350.00 
M4710-01-297-0999 TUBE ASSY, DIL S T TO $    342.00 I        1 $          342.00 
M4710-01 -297-0992 TUBE ASSY DIL S TEE D $    315.00 !        1 $          315.00 
M4710-01-297-0993 TUBE ASSY OX S T OX $    174.00 j        1 $          174.00 
M5310-01-297-0889 NUT, ACORN $        5.80 I        1 $              5.80 
M1386-01-304-7142 MOUTHPIECE $ 1.560.00 I  1      - $       1,560.00 
M5325-01-297-0899 GROMMET, NONMETALLI $      11.00 1        1 $            11.00 | ..... 
TOTAL COST * $      47.727.10 
I  1 
Table 3.2 Repair Parts Summary Report Generated For 
Scenario Described in Figure 2.3 
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less parts demanded. Under the heading four, are the 
probabilities for each repair part that there would be four or 
less repair parts demanded, and so on up to ten or less repair 
parts demanded. Figure 3.3 shows an example of the cumulative 
values generated for the first few repair parts for the Figure 
3.2 scenario. The cumulative table could be designed for any 
number of failures but was limited to ten failures maximum to 
remain within the practical scope of this paper. Equation 
3.1, used to generate the cumulative Poisson table, is an 
inverse variation of Equation 1.1. 
n 
P(X<n) = ^2 -v p.* x\ (3.1) 
Selected Repair Parts Number of Repair Parts Required 
Item Rank Prob of Instock 
by Demand Item Name 0 1 2 3 4 S 
1 CATCH, CLAMPING 0.337925 0.704550 0.903432 0.975356 0.994865 0.999098 
2 GASKET, HOSE CONN 0.365669 0.733542 0.918587 0.980640 0.996247 0.999387 
3 INLINE FILT ASSY 0.477245 0.830275 0.960848 0.993044 0.998998 0.999879 
4 CLAMP, HOSE NO 1 0.641571 0.926323 0.989514 0.998863 0.999901 0.999993 
5 CLAMP, HOSE NO 2 0.641571 0.926323 0.989514 0.998863 0.999901 0.999993 
6 HOSE, AIR BREATHING 0.743869 0.963973 0.996536 0.999748 0.999985 0.999999 
7 OX HI PRESS GAGE ASSY 0.762439 0.969237 0.997283 0.999818 0.999990 1.000000 
8 SCREW, MACH, BLEED 0.789218 0.976036 0.998147 0.999892 0.999995 1.000000 
9 VALVE CHECK 0.800981 0.978733 0.998456 0.999915 0.999996 1.000000 
10 SPRING, HLCL, CPRSN 0.827480 0.984180 0.999017 0.999954 0.999998 1.000000 
Figure 3.3  Sample of Cumulative Poisson Table Generated 
For Scenario in Figure 3.2. 
The next significant step incorporates the "LOOKUP" 
function of the EXCEL 5.0 program. Using the "Minimum 
Protection Level" input by the user, the LOOKUP function, with 
an inverse function, reviews each repair part's array of 
probabilities for the closest value present that is not less 
33 
than the protection level inputted. The value at the top of 
that column of probabilities is the quantity of repair parts 
required to achieve that protection level. This quantity is 
multiplied by the unit cost and summed with the other repair 
parts costs to provide the "Inventory Cost of the Protection 
Level."  An example of the LOOKUP function is: 
= LOOKUP(MPL,AA2:AK2,AA1:AK1) 
where MPL is the Minimum Protection Level cell entered on the 
Control Panel. AA2:AK2 is the range of cells holding that 
repair part's cumulative Poisson array and AA1:AK1 is the 
array of the cumulative Poisson table's column headings. 
The graph provided on the control panel is driven by a 
macro command written in EXCEL's VISUAL BASIC language. A 
column of twenty protection levels, from 0.895 to 0.995 with 
an increment of 0.005, is listed on the page below the Control 
Panel. The macro command is activated when the "Update Chart" 
button is clicked. When activated, the macro takes the first 
value in the protection level column and types the value to 
the cell "Minimum Protection Level" and then enters to refresh 
the data. The "Minimum Protection Level" cell is continuously 
linked to the rest of the spreadsheet and so immediately 
updates the dependent cells. The macro then reads the 
dependent cell "Total Cost" and types it to the cell next to 
the protection level cell used. The macro loops until all the 
protection levels have been entered into the calculation and 
the resultant "Total Costs" have been recorded in the column 
adjacent to the column of protection levels. These two 
columns are linked to the graph on the Control Panel which 
updates as each entry in the column changes. 
Two other macros control the process of printing from the 
Control Panel. The button "Print Report" prints the basic 
information required to identify the repair parts required to 
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achieve the protection level in the selected scenario (See 
Table 3.2). The button "Print Scenario" prints the range of 
cells that comprise the control panel in Figure 3.2. 
F.  LIMITATIONS OF SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE 
This spreadsheet is written in EXCEL version 5.0 in the 
WINDOWS version 3.1 environment. Translating to other 
spreadsheet formats has not been attempted. We expect all 
data and virtually all the formulas to be converted to most 
spreadsheets, for example LOTUS 1-2-3 version 5.0. However, 
there may be a problem in translating the macros. The model 
was run using an IBM compatible 486/33 MHz with 8 meg of RAM. 
Systems with less RAM may crash or run slower during the 
"Chart Update" function. 
The scope of this thesis deliberately focuses the 
attention on the few parts that were expected to be the most 
burden on the budget. With only 78 repair parts included, the 
inventory manager is left to use other means to calculate the 
quantities for the other parts. 
The cumulative Poisson table incorporated in this 
spreadsheet is limited to a maximum of ten or less repair 
parts demanded. Scenarios that require more than ten parts 
will generate a failure signal. Large populations of MK 16, 
long lead time, high OPTEMPO, or a combination of these 
variables, will result in a #N/A symbol in the "Total Cost" 
cell. Generally, the spreadsheet's target was to support an 
EOD Det with four to six MK 16, lead times of less than 90- 
days, and OPTEMPO less than ten times the SPCC reflected 
OPTEMPO. Within these boundaries the failure signal is still 
likely but it can be manipulated out by progressively easing 
the constraints to a scenario not significantly different from 
was intended. 
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In Chapter IV, three scenarios will be presented with a 
comparison of the outcomes from this spreadsheet and the SPCC 
COSAL/APL program. 
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IV.   INVENTORY METHODS COMPARISON AND EVALUATION 
A.  METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter III, we presented the methodology of both the 
APL model and the proposed spreadsheet model for the selection 
of inventories to support the MK 16 when deployed from the 
parent command. In this chapter, we will explore three cases 
that compare the two models. Our basis for comparison will be 
the average protection level for the modeled inventory, the 
minimum protection level within the range of repair parts, and 
the total cost of the inventory. 
The average protection level provides a general feeling 
for how robust the inventory is overall. The minimum 
protection level within an inventory identifies potential 
stockout candidates. For example, an inventory manager may 
achieve an overall average protection of 0.995 but may have 
several items with little or no protection. These few low 
protection items do not lower the average significantly but 
will still cause stockout problems. 
The costs of the inventories provide the third factor of 
our bottom line. Protection levels should include the 
associated costs to gauge the overall effect on the command's 
budget; an extremely high and expensive protection level for 
the MK 16 is of little value if the other equipment supporting 
the mission were underfunded. 
With our comparators established, our evaluation of the 
inventories must be balanced. The APL model provides a 
different inventory dependent on the number of MK 16 assigned. 
Listed in columns for (4), (5-8), and (9-20) systems, the 
three different inventories identify the types and quantities 
of repair parts authorized (See Table 3.1). These are preset 
quantities with the assumptions of a 90-day lead time, OPTEMPO 
based on the average of the last ten months, and a goal of 
0.90 protection or better.  Also preset is the cost of each 
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inventory; only with reevaluation by SPCC will these presets 
change. 
To identify the protection level achieved for an APL 
repair part we use the quantity allowed for that part and 
enter the associated column within the cumulative Poisson 
table. The value listed for that part in the cumulative 
Poisson table is the probability of less than or equal to that 
number of repair parts being demanded. This is the protection 
level for that repair part. The average of the protection 
levels of all the repair parts and the minimum protection 
level found within the list of repair parts are the 
comparators of that APL column. If the scenario is changed, 
the cumulative Poisson table will change to reflect a 
different demand distribution. This will generate a different 
average and minimum protection level for that column's 
inventory. 
The proposed spreadsheet model is able to adjust the type 
and quantity of repair parts as each input to the scenario 
changes.  Either the average protection level or inventory 
cost can be held constant as the scenario changes.  This 
allows us to explore two options, that of finding the least 
costly inventory that provides as much protection as the APL, 
or finding the highest protection level possible without 
exceeding the current costs of the APL.  For our comparisons, 
the variable held constant will be adjusted to be as close to 
the APL's value as possible.  If the spreadsheet model's cost 
is to be held constant with that of the APL, the model's cost 
will be adjusted to be equal to or less than the APL cost.  If 
average protection level is to be held constant with the APL, 
the spreadsheet model's protection level will be adjusted to 
be equal to, or greater than the APL's value. 
In the case that follows, we will monitor the overall 
average protection levels, minimum protection level, and 
the costs for various scenarios.  Figure 4.1 provides a brief 
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Highest Average P. L. Achieved 
Lowest Average P. L. Achieved 
Highest Minimum P. L Achieved 
Lowest Minimum P. L. Achieved 
Cost 
Highest Average P. L. Achieved 
Lowest Average P. L. Achieved 
Highest Minimum P. L. Achieved 
Lowest Minimum P. L. Achieved 
Cost 
Highest Average P. L. Achieved 
Lowest Average P. L. Achieved 
Highest Minimum P. L. Achieved 
Lowest Minimum P. L. Achieved 
Cost 
Case One: Lead Time = 90 Days, 
OPTEMPO Changes from 1 to 5, 
Number of Active MK 16 = 4 
Costs Approx. Equal 
Case Two (a): Lead Time Changes from 
15 to 90 Days, OPTEMPO = 1, 
Number of Active MK 16 = 4 
Costs Approx. Equal 
APL 14) Model        1  Spreadsheet Model APL (4) Model Spreadsheet Modei 
0.989 0.994 0.999 0.999 
0.884 0.935 0.989 0.994 
0.903 0.973 0.996 0.997 
0.093 0.841 0.903 0.976 
$46,131 $43,142 to $46,848 $46,131 $44,726 to $46,032 
Case Two (b): Lead Time Changes from 
15 to 90 Days, OPTEMPO = 1, 
Number of Active MK 16 = 4 
Ava Protection Levels Approx. Equal 
Case Three (a): Desert Storm with Lead rime 
= 45 Days, OPTEMPO = 5, 
Number of Active MK 16 = 4 
Costs Approx. Equal 
APL (4) Model Spreadsheet Model APL (4) Model Spreadsheet Model 
0.999 0.999 0.950 0.972 
0.989 0.989 N/A N/A 
0.996 0.996 0.490 0.917 
0.903 0.966 N/A N/A 
$46,131 $40,706 to $44,412 $46,131 $42,506 
Case Three (b): Desert Storm with Lead Time 
= 45 Days, OPTEMPO = 5, 
Number of Active MK 16 = 4 
ProDosed Min Protection Level > 0.90 
Case Three (c): Desert Storm with Lead I ime 
= 45 Days, OPTEMPO = 5, 
Number of Active MK 16 = 4 
Proposed Average Protection Level > 0.95 
APL (4) Model Spreadsheet Model APL (4) Model Spreadsheet Model 
0.950 0.962 0.950 0.956 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
0.490 0.906 0.490 0.884 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
$46,131 $27,763 $46,131 $26,539 
Figure 4.1  Scenario Descriptions with Outcomes, 
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summary of each case with the results for quick comparison. 
Greater detail for evaluating an individual scenario is 
provided with the graphs associated with each case. 
B.  CASE 1:  THE EFFECT OF INCREASES IN OPTEMPO ON MINIMUM AND 
AVERAGE PROTECTION LEVELS 
The first case begins with the original APL assumptions 
of lead time = 90 days, active MK 16 = 4, and OPTEMPO = 1. An 
increase in OPTEMPO is reflected as an increase in the demand 
rate for repair parts (These parameters are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter III) . If an EOD Det has doubled its 
OPTEMPO, then its consumption of repair parts will be expected 
to double. During Desert Storm, one EOD Det dove over 90-days 
in a four month period; a substantial increase over normal 
operations of 15 to 25 training dives in the same period. 
Figure 4.2 displays the relationship between the two 
models' minimum and average protection levels and OPTEMPO as 
OPTEMPO increases. The APL (4) column enjoys a large number 
of repair parts included as insurance items. As discussed in 
Chapter II and displayed in Figure 2.3, insurance items have 
a higher average protection level than demand items. With 
OPTEMPO set at one, the APL (4) column provides most of the 
repair parts at a protection level of 0.995 or higher. This 
brings the average protection level up to 0.989. A gap exists 
as the BRF for a repair part increases to the level of it 
becoming a demand item rather than an insurance item. Again 
as displayed in Figure 2.3, demand items are stocked at 
protection levels that range from 0.995 to 0.900. In fact, 
the APL (4) has one repair part with a protection level of 
0.903. This range is still acceptable within the SPCC goal of 
0.900 or greater protection. 
The proposed spreadsheet inventory model provides only a 
slightly higher average protection level at an OPTEMPO of 
one, 0.994 vs. 0.989 for the APL model.  However, the minimum 
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1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 
OPTEMPO (1 = 10 Month Demand Average) 
4.5 
-•—APL Minimum Protection Level 
-■—Spreadsheet Model Minimum Protection Level 
-A—APL Average Protection Level 
X- - • Spreadsheet Model Average Protection Level 
Figure 4.2 Comparison of Protection Levels for the APL (4) Column and the Spreadsheet Model as 
OPTEMPO Increases (Spreadsheet Model Costs 
< APL Costs) . 
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protection levels at this OPTEMPO are significantly different; 
APL (4) inventory minimum of 0.903 vs. 0.973 minimum 
protection for the spreadsheet model (These values are 
displayed in tabular form in Figure 4.1) . The spreadsheet has 
the flexibility to adjust the stock level on items that have 
an inherent protection level that is acceptable to the user. 
The money saved on these items is then applied to items with 
protection levels that are lower than acceptable. The costs 
are held constant and the average protection level is similar, 
but the deviation from the average is reduced. By increasing 
the probability of a stockout on some insurance items by as 
little as 0.005, we were able to decrease the probability of 
a stockout on high usage demand items as much as 0.090. 
As OPTEMPO increases, the APL (4) average protection 
level drops at nearly the same rate as for the spreadsheet. 
At an OPTEMPO five times greater than normal, the APL (4) 
average is 0.884 while the spreadsheet average is 0.935. The 
minimum protection level for the APL (4) falls at a much 
faster rate. As the demand rate increases for those items 
without insurance protection, their probability of experienc- 
ing a stockout grows. Although an insurance item with a 0.996 
protection level at an OPTEMPO of one drops only to 0.919, the 
demand item with a protection level of 0.903 drops to 0.093 
(See Figure 4.1). 
The ability of the spreadsheet to adjust the repair parts 
quantities results in all repair parts stocked at a minimum 
protection level over 0.841 for the same cost as the APL (4). 
In fact, the model that provided the spreadsheet protection 
levels described here required a much lower cost than the APL 
(4) so that we could meet our criterion of not exceeding 
the cost of the APL (4) inventory. Where the APL (4) cost 
$46,131, the spreadsheet model cost $ 43,142; a savings of 
nearly $ 3,000.  Project this savings, to include all the 
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costs of inventory, over the fleet and the gain is substantial 
for both budgets and operations. 
C.  CASE 2:  THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN LEAD TIMES ON MINIMUM 
AND AVERAGE PROTECTION LEVELS 
The second case focuses on the effect of lead times. 
Using the inputs of four active MK 16, OPTEMPO of one and 
costs held constant, we see a decline in protection levels as 
lead time increases. (Figure 4.3) With a short lead time of 
15 days and 3 0 days, both the APL (4) column and the spread- 
sheet have very similar average and minimum protection levels 
above 0.990. As lead time increases, the APL (4) minimum 
protection level drops to the minimum acceptable level, near 
0.900. 
The relationship of increased protection as the lead 
times shorten reflects a decreased pressure on the inventory 
stock between restocks. If two parts in inventory provide a 
0.900 protection level during a 90-day demand period, there is 
a 90% probability that two, or less, parts will be demanded. 
If the demand period is shortened, the probability that the 
demand will be two or less during that period will increase. 
Stated another way, as lead times get shorter, there is less 
need for inventory. An EOD Det with access to overnight 
delivery service could operate with virtually no inventory. 
On a cautionary note, lead times can vary widely from order to 
order and the worst possible case should be the estimate. 
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Lead Time (Days) 
-♦—APL Minimum Protection Level 
-a—Spreadsheet Model Minimum Protection Level 
■är - -APL Average Protection Level 
-H—Spreadsheet Mode) Average Protection Level 
Figure 4.3 Comparison of Protection Levels for APL (4) 
Inventory and Spreadsheet Model Inventory as 
Lead Time Changes From 15 to 90 Days. 
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As lead time decreases, the inventory manager has the 
choice of reducing the inventory quantities to maintain the 
historical protection levels and reap the cost savings, or 
maintain the inventory levels and costs to enjoy a much higher 
than historical protection level. Figure 4.3 displays the 
route of holding costs constant as lead time decreases. The 
APL (4) column's fixed inventory list and costs only permit us 
to gain the benefits of increased protection at the historical 
cost. The spreadsheet approach allows us to identify what the 
cost savings would be if we hold protection levels at their 
historical values. Figure 4.4 displays the inventory 
cost/lead time relationship with the average protection level 
held constant at the APL (4) level with 90-day lead time. If 
a conservative inventory manager believed that lead time was 
truly 90 days, the spreadsheet generated inventory would cost 
$40,706 with an average protection level of 0.990 and a 
minimum protection level of 0.966. (See Figure 4.2) Compared 
to the APL (4) column cost of $46,131, average protection 
level of 0.989 and minimum protection level of 0.903, the 
spreadsheet provides a savings of $5,425 and an increase in 
the minimum protection level from 0.903 to 0.966. 
If the inventory manager is convinced that the lead time 
is shorter, the savings increase with every reduction until, 
at around a 15 day lead time, the spreadsheet model inventory 
cost becomes zero. The inherent reliability of the MK 16 
individual parts provide a minimum probability 0.966 and an 
average probability of 0.989 that no parts will be required 
during that 15 day period. This assumes the OPTEMPO of one 
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Lead Time (Days) 
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Figure 4.4 Spreadsheet Model Inventory Cost Changes as 
Lead Time Changes from 15 to 90 Days 
(Spreadsheet Model Average Protection Level 
> APL  (4)  Average  Protection Level  of 
0.9885) . 
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D.  CASE 3:  DESERT STORM 
1. Worst Case Scenario 
Forecasting the demands that an inventory will experience 
is the most difficult task. Forecasting based on past 
demands, like the last ten quarters average demand, results in 
an inventory very capable of supporting an average quarter at 
a reasonable cost. Forecasting for the worst possible case 
provides an inventory that in an average quarter appears so 
robust as to be wasteful, yet is the minimum required to 
support the worst case scenario. Case 3 describes a model 
experienced by some EOD Dets during and immediately following 
Desert Storm in 1991. The factors used in this case were 
compiled from telephone interviews with people both on the 
supply and the receiving ends of the repair parts pipeline. 
This is not meant to document Desert Storm, but to provide an 
approximation of the episode as an example of worst case 
demand. 
2. OPTEMPO 
Once established, the EOD Det began MCM operations that 
stabilized at a six-day-on, one-day-off schedule. Some 
operations exceeded ten days straight of diving. Each of the 
four MK 16 were readied for each diving day. Out of a 
deployment of 120 days, the EOD Det conducted diving 
operations approximately 90 to 100 days. 
Peace-time OPTEMPO used by SPCC is an average of the 
demand over the last ten quarters. Some EOD personnel 
estimate their normal schedule provides an average of one to 
two diving days a week for training. For the purposes of this 
case, we will estimate that Desert Storm OPTEMPO was five 
times greater than the normal. 
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3. Lead Time 
Once a repair parts pipeline has been established, 
resupply becomes more routine and predictable. Initially, the 
EOD Det went nearly 3 0 days before the first order arrived. 
After that, a normal reorder would be filled in an average of 
14 days, and a special order would be filled in ten days. 
Orders would be transmitted electronically to the parent 
command and processed within 24 hours, then immediately 
shipped. The order would arrive in the geographic area of the 
EOD Det in three to five days. Transporting the order from 
the geographic depot to the EOD Det embarked at sea could take 
an additional week. 
As conservative inventory managers, we will use 45 days 
as the lead time estimate. This covers the actual 3 0 day 
maximum lead time experienced and a buffer of an additional 15 
days. 
4. Protection Level, Cost, and Rational Analysis 
At this point the inventory manager has arrived at the 
estimates for OPTEMPO and lead time with the number of active 
MK 16 fixed at four. As discussed in the first two cases, the 
inventory manager can choose to maximize protection level 
within a prescribed budget or to prescribe an acceptable 
protection level and obtain the minimum cost. A third method 
would be to analyze the graph provided on the control panel to 
determine if there is a point that permits a large increase in 
protection level for only a small increase in cost. Using a 
budget figure that is just short of a huge increase in 
protection might be a false economy. 
For the purposes of comparing the APL (4) inventory to 
the spreadsheet model's inventory we will run four scenarios. 
The first will assume that the inventory manager wants the 
highest possible protection level available without exceeding 
the APL (4) cost. In the second scenario, the inventory 
manager wants to minimize costs and while maintaining the 
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protection levels intended for the APL (4) ; no item with a 
protection level less than 0.900. Additionally, the average 
protection level achieved for the APL (4) inventory will be 
tested. The fourth scenario will be a rational analysis of 
the spreadsheet's Control Panel graph. The assumption will be 
that the inventory manager has some leeway with picking the 
amount budgeted for this mission and will search for a point 
on the graph that achieves a high marginal return for the 
cost. 
a. What is the Maximum Average Protection Level 
that can be Achieved Within the Cost Constraint 
of  the APL   (4)   Inventory? 
The process begins by entering the Control Panel of 
the spreadsheet with a lead time of 45 days, OPTEMPO of 5, and 
4 active MK 16. Clicking the button marked "Update Chart" 
refreshes the chart based on the new inputs. The macro 
command attached to the button will cycle through the possible 
minimum protection levels from 0.900 to 0.995, stopping at 
0.995 and generating the "Total Cost" of the inventory that 
achieves that the protection level of 0.995. 
With your budget defined as the cost of the APL (4) 
column, $46,131, systematically reduce the entry in "Enter 
Minimum Protection Level" until the "Total Cost" output is 
$46,131 or less. Following this process we obtain an 
inventory cost of $42,506; a $3,625 savings. Average 
protection level is 0.972 and the minimum protection level for 
any repair part is 0.917. (See Figure 4.2) The cost savings 
in this case was unavoidable given the constraint of not 
exceeding the cost of APL (4). If permitted a slight overrun 
of less that 1% ($404), we can reduce the average chance of a 
stockout by 44% (2.76% to 1.57%). This also increases the 
average protection level from 0.972 to 0.984 and the minimum 
protection level from 0.917 to 0.940.  This compares well to 
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the protection levels generated by the APL (4) inventory. If 
the APL (4) inventory was used, the average chance of a 
stockout more than triples (1.57% to 4.97%) . More important, 
the minimum protection level has dropped to 0.490 with nine 
high demand items having a protection level less than the 
minimum acceptable level of 0.900. 
b. What is the Cost Saving if a Minimum Protection 
Level  of 0.900 is Selected? 
Without changing the other inputs listed above, 
change the "Minimum Protection Level" entry to 0.900.  The 
average protection level is still higher than provided by APL 
(4), 0.962, and it is achieved at a total cost of $27,763. 
This $18,368 savings has the advantages of a higher minimum 
and average protection level than the APL (4) achieves with an 
inventory that anticipates a wartime preparedness. 
c. What is the Cost Savings if the Spreadsheet 
Model's Average Protection Level is Set Equal 
to  that Achieved by the APL   (4)   Inventory? 
The APL (4) inventory achieved an average protection 
level of 0.950 and a minimum protection level of 0.490.  The 
procedure for comparing the average and minimum protection 
levels requires entering the spreadsheet beyond the Control 
Panel.  A hidden area to the right of the Control Panel 
generates the average and minimum protection levels.   To 
analyze the question posed, the "Enter Minimum Protection 
Level" input would be systematically adjusted until the 
spreadsheet's average protection level was approximately equal 
to the APL (4)'s average protection level of 0.9503.  The 
total cost for the spreadsheet model's inventory is $26,53 9 
with an average protection level of 0.956 and a minimum 
protection level of 0.884. 
50 
d. At What Points on the Control Panel Graph is 
there the Greatest Marginal Gain in Protection 
at an Acceptable  Cost? 
Figure 4.5 provides the printout of the Control 
Panel view for Case 3 . To find points on the graph that might 
yield the greatest gain in protection for the dollar, 
systematically adjust the "Enter Minimum Protection Level" 
input around the points on the graph at the beginning of a 
steep section.  The horizontal areas show a section where a 
small vertical rise in costs generates a large horizontal jump 
in protection.  The point at the right-hand end of one of 
these large horizontal jumps is where any additional increase 
in protection incurs a large cost penalty.  This might be the 
addition of a few high cost repair parts needed to achieve the 
next higher level of protection. 
CONTROL PANEL 
Enter Lead Time 
Estimate) 1 to 90 Days) =[ 45 
Enter OPTEMPO Estimate 
(X Peacetime) =f 
Enter Minimum Protection 
Level (0.899 to 0.995) = |    0.971 
,    Enter Number 
Of MK 16 (Active) = f 
Enter Number 
OfMK16(layup)=r 
Inventory Cost of _ 
Protection Level = 
Penalty Cost of One Spare 
$51,927 
$42,000 





c Print Scenario 
Protection Level /Costs Relationship 












Model will change service level to 0.999 when "Update Chart" is selected. Reenter Minimum Protection Level desired before printing. 
Figure 4.5.   View of Control Panel for Case 3 
Rational Analysis. 
All inventory managers are constrained by some 
budget limit, but there is usually some latitude.  Looking at 
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the graph in Figure 4.5, one point worth investigating at the 
low cost/low protection level end of the graph would be in the 
vicinity of 0.905. A cost increase of nearly $10,000 is 
required to obtain the next small increase in protection. 
Once the plateau of $46,535 is reached, the minimum protection 
level can be increased from 0.918 to 0.971 for only an 11.6% 
increase in costs. This additional $5,3 92 reduces the average 
chance of a stockout 55%, from 1.57% to 0.70%. The proposed 
inventory generated by the spreadsheet for this scenario is 
provided as Table 4.1. If this is deemed a critical mission, 
a third point, 0.986, would cost nearly $60,000. Advances in 
protection level beyond this point are exceedingly costly. If 
greater protection is important, a more practical direction 
might be to use a portion of the funds to further reduce the 
lead time. 
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Table 4.1  Repair Parts Summary Report Generated For 




M5340-01-298-3012 CATCH, CLAMPING 
GASKET, HOSE CONN 
M4240-01-298-3005 
M4730-01-296-5863 








Unit Cost   I Quantity Total Cost 
INLINE FILT ASSY 
CLAMP, HOSE NO 1 
HOSE, AIR BREATHING 
OX HI PRESS GAGE ASSY 
SCREW, MACH, BLEED 
VALVE CHECK 










SCREW, MACH,PHD #6 
CENTER SECTION 
CONN HSG ASSY ELEC 
DIAPHRAM 








$    254.00 
$      11.50 
S      11.50 
9.00 
$ 1,430.00 
$       17.50 
$       10.50 
$ 6.90 
$       11.00 
$      92.00 





$      19.00 
37.00 
SCREW, MACH, PNH 
VALVE, HANDWHEEL 
H8120-01-297-0901 















OIL VALVE ASSY 
SECONDARY DISP ASSY 
PRI DISPLAY ASSY 
VALVE, CHECK ASSY 
REG OIL ASSY 
OXY REG MTD ASSY 
OIL REG ASSY 
OXY REG ASSY 
BYPASS VALVASSYDIL 
BODY. VALVE SUBASSY 
3.70 
$ 3.70 
$      22.50 
$ 1,810.00 
$     298.00 
$ 4,060.00 






$    606.00 
BYPASS VALV ASSY OXY 
49.00 
$     736.00 
LID, CANISTER $    164.00 
SCREW, MACH 
PRI ELECTRONIC DISP 
" SCREW, MACH,FH.82#6 
H4810-01 -297-5976 OXY ADDITION VALVE 
H4820-01-297-5977 OXY VALVE REG 











WAIST STRAP ASSY LEF 
SHOULD STRAP LEFT 
FLTG, BHD.ASSY,ELEC 
TUBE ASSY 
TUBE ASSY, OIL REG 
TUBE ASSY, FL CTRL, OX 
TUBE ASSY, DILBPSC 
TUBE ASSY, DIL REG TO 
S 3.70 
$ 6,390.00 
S        3.70 
$ 6,010.00 
$ 1,050.00 
$    396.00 
$    375.00 
$    369.00 
$    111.00 
$    706.00 
$    497.00 
$     478.00 
$    397.00 
S    396.00 
$    350.00 
























#MK 16 (Active) = 












































Table  4.1   (Continued) 
M4710-01-297-0999 TUBE ASSY, OIL S T TO $    342.00 1        | $          342.00 
M4710-01-297-0992 TUBE ASSY DIL STEED $    315.00 $          315.00 
M4710-01-297-0993 TUBE ASSY OX ST OX $     174.00 $          174.00 
M5310-01-297-0839 NUT, ACORN $        5.80 $              5.80 
M1386-01-304-7142 MOUTHPIECE $ 1,560.00 $       1,560.00 
M5325-01-297-0899 GROMMET, NONMETALLI $       11.00 $            11.00 
M4710-01-296-5981 TUBE ASSY, DIL ADD $     148.00 $          148.00 
M5305-01-296-5812 NUT, JAM SMALL PATTER $        5.80 $              5.80 
M6150-01-297-0903 CABLE ASSY, PRIMARY $    722.00 $          722.00 
M4240-01 -297-5994 CANISTER ASSY $    709.00 $          709.00 
M4820-01-297-5968 SEAT, VALVE S     180.00 $          180.00 
M1386-01-295-9261 SEAT, HELIC $      24.00 $            24.00 
M5340-01-297-0985 CAP, SECONDARY DISP S      22.50 $            22.50 
M5920-01-304-6745 FUSEHOLDER $        6.20J $              6.20 
M5305-O1 -'298-5805 SCREW, MACHTR8Z0 $        4.20 *               4.20 
M5310-01-298-2807 NUT, PLAIN, HEX $        5.80 $              5.80 
M5310-01-297-0890 NUT, SECONDARY DISPL S      61.00 $            61.00 
M5365-01-300-0091 RING, RETAIN, THRD UPP $      28.50 $            28.50 
TOTAL COST = $      51,927.40 
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V.   SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis was to provide the inventory- 
manager with a decision support model to assist in determining 
the most effective mix of repair parts to support a MK 16 
deployment. Effective, in this case, implies that within the 
constraints of the scenario defined, this list of parts will 
provide the least number of stockouts. In inventory problems 
more parts generally means less stockouts; fully operational 
spares also means less stockouts. It is common for inventory 
managers to augment the authorized inventory when repeated 
shortages tell them that the numbers in the APL don't suffice. 
However, this scenario is seldom played in reverse; they 
seldom cut back on an authorized inventory item when 
experience indicates it is overstocked. The precaution the 
inventory manager takes is to keep it in inventory "just in 
case." 
Provisioning an inventory strictly from the knowledge and 
experience of the inventory manager may possibly yield the 
better list of repair parts. Transferring this expert 
knowledge and multiplying it throughout the fleet is, however, 
unrealistic. Conversely, there is little success in applying 
a prescribed inventory (that was built upon a single, general 
scenario) to every situation. The proposed spreadsheet model 
provides support for the inventory manager's decision through 
the simplified representation of complex mathematical 
functions and the graphic display of alternatives. The 
manager still defines the scenario and makes the final 
decision; a decision no longer based on intuition, but based 
on a logical examination of the goals and constraints. 
In Chapter IV we examined the differences between the 
repair parts listed in the MK 16 APL and the repair parts 
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calculated by the spreadsheet model.  A few generalizations 
standout: 
1. In all cases, the APL (4) model and the spreadsheet 
model were closest in output when using the APL's 
assumptions of scenario (OPTEMPO = 1, lead time = 90 
days). 
2. Even when the models were close, the APL provided 
substantially greater protection for low demand 
items, mostly considered insurance items, than it 
did for high demand items. The spreadsheet main- 
tained the low demand and high demand items with 
equally high protection. By reducing several 
insurance items from 0.999 to 0.995 for example, 
many demand items' protection could be raised from 
0.900 to 0.995. 
3. As the scenarios moved further from the APL's 
scenario assumptions, the APL maintained good 
protection for items with low demand but failed to 
provide support for high demand items. There was no 
significant difference between these protection 
levels with the spreadsheet model. 
4. In all cases, the spreadsheet model was able to 
provide higher average protection, higher minimum 
protection and lower costs. 
An important assumption in the repair parts selected for 
this study was that they are all mission essential. The 
spreadsheet model looks past the insurance/demand issue and 
focuses on the probability of demand. Where a single part may 
have an APL authorization of one providing a protection level 
of 0.995, having no parts may still provide a protection of 
0.980. If this were a high cost item, the funds could be 
applied to several low cost/high demand items where an 
additional part may boost protection from 0.910 to 0.980. The 
spreadsheet model automatically balances these costs to 
achieve the highest average protection available. 
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B.  CONCLUSIONS 
1. OPTEMPO and Lead Time Estimates Require Greater 
Flexibility- 
Invaluable for fleet-wide provisioning, the assumption of 
a 90-day lead time and a forecasted demand based on the past 
ten months' average demand does not accurately model the case 
for an EOD Det. The 90-day lead time is being modified for 
much of the fleet, but will likely result in an inflexible 
model that is accurate for many, but not all, situations. The 
inventory manager supporting both non-deploying EOD Dets 
within the continental U. S. and EOD Dets in the Indian Ocean, 
Korea, and Japan needs the flexibility to set the lead time 
estimate to achieve the most appropriate protection within the 
constraints of budget. 
OPTEMPO of an EOD Det in training, during exercises, and 
on a peacetime deployment varies dramatically from that 
experienced during Desert Storm. Our spreadsheet model allows 
the command flexibility in supporting a forecast of OPTEMPO; 
this puts control of the command's resources back into the 
hands of the Commanding Officer. 
2. Decrease O-Level Insurance Items: Increase O-Level 
Demand Items 
Insurance items provide a guard against an unexpected 
failure. Their history of demand indicates that they are 
unlikely to fail. (Less than 2.5 per 100 per year for some). 
Their protection level averages much higher than for a demand 
item. This distinction is important early in the life-cycle 
of an equipment as SPCC accumulates demand data. Equal 
treatment permits a substantial increase in overall protection 
level with no increase in cost. 
A second purpose of insurance items is to protect against 
an increase in failures as the equipment ages. This justifies 
procurement and stocking of insurance items by SPCC, or at 
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major stock points like the parent commands. The large number 
of insurance items maintained at the O-Level implies that the 
failures will happen suddenly and unexpectedly, fleet-wide, 
before SPCC can respond as a consequence of increased BRF 
values. Stocking these items in smaller quantities at the 
parent commands provides easy access to the EOD Dets. The 
additional protection provided to insurance items detracts 
from the protection levels of the demand items. The result is 
compensation by the inventory managers with augmented 
inventories and spare MK 16 in lay-up deployed to ensure 
protection. 
3.   Allocate Repair Parts by Increments, Not Groupings 
The groupings in APL columns (5-8) and (9-20) force 
commands into different levels of readiness. If one facet of 
readiness is whether or not the command can affect timely 
repairs, those commands with twenty MK 16 are less ready than 
the commands with nine. If an average protection level of 
0.993 is deemed adequate for a command with nine MK 16 at a 
cost of $51,055, is 0.956 inadequate at the same cost for a 
command with twenty MK 16? More significantly, the command 
with twenty MK 16 operates with a minimum protection level of 
0.758 while the command with nine enjoys a minimum of 0.970. 
Another problematic case is the inherent protection 
levels associated with being on the cusp of a grouping. To 
describe this situation we will use the Desert Storm scenario 
detailed in Chapter IV, with a lead time of 45 days, OPTEMPO 
= 5. When evaluating this scenario for an EOD Det operating 
with five MK 16 provisioned from the APL (5-8) column, and an 
EOD Det operating with four MK 16 and provisioned from the APL 
(4) column we receive significantly different protection 
levels. The EOD Det with five MK 16 would experience an 
average protection level of 0.9630 and a minimum of 0.7460. 
This compares to the EOD Det with four MK 16 average of 0.9503 
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and minimum of 0.4906. Despite accomplishing 25% more diving 
hours with the additional MK 16, the EOD Det with five MK 16 
would experience an average of 25% less  stockouts. 
The proposed spreadsheet approach eliminates the need for 
grouping the quantities of systems and permits exact calcula- 
tions. The danger is that, during this evaluation by inven- 
tory managers, the EOD Det with five MK 16's protection will 
be brought down to match that of the EOD Det with four MK 16 
in the interest of cost savings. This would likely lead to 
greater hoarding of parts and additional spare MK 16 deployed 
to protect against stockouts. The goal of the calculation 
should be to determine the greatest protection level possible 
and take the cost savings from the reduced hoarding, reduced 
capital tied up in spares, and reduced CASREPS. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Four areas within this thesis suggest additional 
research. First, introduce simulation modeling to the 
scenarios discussed in Chapter IV. Simulation modeling would 
expand our understanding of the probabilistic relationships as 
events change over time. By avoiding more of the constraining 
assumptions of the spreadsheet, simulation allows us to study 
the dynamic behavior of the supply pipeline. 
Second, this thesis focuses on supporting the end-user 
through allowing greater flexibility in provisioning their 
repair parts inventory. We have not discussed how this 
flexibility might affect the repair parts pipeline upstream. 
The influence of this changing pool of repair parts at the 0- 
Level on SPCC requires additional attention. 
Third, this thesis relies heavily on the strength of our 
OPTEMPO and lead time estimate, and on BRF. Accurate 
estimates require sustained data collection efforts, evalua- 
tion and updating. Designing and implementing this feedback 
system and extrapolating the information to real world worst 
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case scenarios would strengthen the inputs required for the 
spreadsheet model. 
Fourth, the true value of a spare MK 16 to an EOD Det is 
unclear. What is the value in terms of increased readiness 
and what is the true cost of the spare MK 16? If there is 
only a small penalty for deploying additional spare MK 16, 
there may be important savings realized by reducing or 
eliminating the repair parts inventory. Additionally, with 
reliable and short lead times, the parent command might 
function as a intermediate maintenance facility. These 
concepts for reducing the O-Level maintenance and inventory 
burden on the deployed EOD Det are areas worth investigating. 
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